Caribbean Epidemiology Centre

Surveillance guidelines

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CARIBBEAN EPIDEMIOLOGY CENTRE

Surveillance guidelines in response to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) global epidemic

at national level

 

According to the current knowledge on SARS global epidemic at 28 March 2003

 

1 - Targeted audiences

  • Clinical personnel: doctors, nurses, etc. (anybody in regular close contact with the suspected/probable SARS case).
  • Hospital clinical laboratory staff and/or public health laboratories
  • Ministries of Health and Hospital Administration

2 - Overall objective

Strengthen surveillance and infection control measures in CAREC member countries

3 - Specific objectives

  1. Raise awareness on SARS risks and good surveillance practices
  2. Provide CMC adapted guidelines for SARS case management and investigation
  3. Reduce the risk of transmission of SARS infection (good infection control practices)
  4. Ensure appropriateness of clinical sample taking, transportation in-country and overseas shipment to reference laboratories

4 - Messages for each of the audiences

To this date cases of SARS can only be imported cases in CAREC member countries.

      Clinical personnel (doctors and nurses)

·        Clinicians must be on the alert for any severe febrile acute respiratory syndrome with a history of travel within 10 days to SARS affected countries – refer to full case definition in the next Guidelines section.

·        Clinicians will also play an essential role in specimen collection and in notifying SARS suspected cases to the national health authorities and laboratory.

      National laboratory personnel

  • Shall ensure the quality of the samples and the completeness of the information collected
  • Prepare the samples for safe transportation to reference laboratories, having given prior notification to these reference laboratories.

Ministries of Health and Hospital Administrations

  • Ensure that these guidelines are disseminated to the relevant authorities and implemented by all health care personnel.
  • Provide the appropriate arrangements for isolation facilities and sundries to allow infection control measures to be implemented at all required levels.

5 – Guidelines for activities

      5.1 - SURVEILLANCE

Surveillance activities should focus on the following case-definition (revised 18 March 2003)

Suspect Case

A person presenting after 1 February 2003 with history of :

  • high fever (>38oC or 100.4F)

    AND

  • one or more respiratory symptoms including cough, shortness of breath, difficulty breathing

     AND one or more of the following:

  • close contact*, within 10 days of onset of symptoms, with a person who has been diagnosed with SARS
  • history of travel, within 10 days of onset of symptoms, to an area in which there are reported foci of transmission of SARS (regurlarly check WHO updates at http://www.who.int/csr/sars/en 

Probable Case

A suspect case with chest x-ray findings of pneumonia or Respiratory Distress Syndrome

OR

A suspect case with an unexplained respiratory illness resulting in death, with an autopsy examination demonstrating the pathology of Respiratory Distress Syndrome without an identifiable cause.

Comments

In addition to fever and respiratory symptoms, SARS may be associated with other symptoms including: headache, muscular stiffness, loss of appetite, malaise, confusion, rash, and diarrhea.

*Close contact means having cared for, having lived with, or having had direct contact with respiratory secretions and body fluids of a person with SARS.

  • Report immediately to the national Epidemiologist and inform National Public Health Laboratory.
  • Monitor occurrence of acute febrile illness among hospital workers and close family contacts of SARS suspected cases.

5.2 - MANAGEMENT OF CASES AND CONTACTS    

            MANAGEMENT OF SUSPECT CASES 

  • Patients with symptoms of SARS should be triaged immediately to designated examination rooms or wards 
  • Patients with with suspected SARS should be issued with surgical mask
  • Obtain and record detailed clinical, travel and contact history including occurrence of acute respiratory diseases in contact persons during the last 10 days 
  • Take chest X-ray (CXR) and full blood count (FBC) 

if CXR is normal: 

  • Provide advice on personal hygiene, avoidance of crowded areas and public transportation, remain at home until well 
  • Discharge with advice to seek medical care if respiratory symptoms worsen 

if CXR demonstrates uni- or bi-lateral infiltrates with or without interstitial infiltration 

  • SEE MANAGEMENT OF PROBABLE CASES

MANAGEMENT OF PROBABLE CASES 

  • Hospitalize under isolation or cohorted with other SARS cases 
  • Send samples for laboratory investigation (if possible) and exclusion of known causes of atypical pneumonia – for sample collection procedures, refer to the attached document to CAREC Alert # 2: 

o nasopharyngeal swabs/aspirates

o blood for serology

o post mortem examination as appropriate

This should be co-ordinated through your national public health authority and CAREC. Samples should be investigated in laboratories with proper containment facilities (BSL3).

  • Immediately REFER samples to the national Public Health Laboratory at room temperature. IF this will take more than 4 hours, samples should be refrigerated (+ 4C) and transported with ice-packs.
  • CXR as clinically indicated 
  • treat as clinically indicated

Comments:

Before giving any treatment collect appropriate samples e.g. nasopharyngeal swabs or aspirates and blood without anti coagulants (red top tubes)

Fill in the appropriate laboratory forms with date of onset of the illness and date of sample collection and print clearly SARS suspected case on the form.  Send samples to the National Public Health Laboratory at room temperature following universal transportation procedures.  If this takes more than 4 hours, samples should be refrigerated (+4C) and transported with ice-packs.

Broad-spectrum antibiotics have not appeared to be proven effective in halting SARS progression to date. Intravenous ribavirin and steroids may have stabilised the condition of one critically ill patient.

MANAGEMENT OF CONTACTS OF SUSPECTED AND PROBABLE CASES 

  • Provide reassurance 
  • Record name and contact details 
  • Provide advice in the event of fever or respiratory symptoms to: 

o immediately report to doctor/physician/health authority 

o not report to work until advised by health authority 

o avoid public places until advised by health authority 

o minimize contact with family members and friends

  • Implement the following Hospital Infection Control Measures

CARE FOR PATIENTS WITH PROBABLE SARS: HOSPITAL INFECTION CONTROL MEASURES

WHO advises strict adherence with the barrier nursing of patients with SARS using precautions for airborne, droplet and contact transmission.

Triage nurses should rapidly divert persons presenting to their health care facility with flu-like symptoms to a separate assessment area to minimise transmission to others in the waiting room. Suspect cases should wear surgical masks until SARS is excluded.

Patients with probable SARS should be isolated and accommodated as follows in descending order of preference:

  • Negative pressure rooms with the door closed 
  • Single rooms with their own bathroom facilities 
  • Cohort placement in an area with an independent air supply and exhaust system.
  • If an independent air supply is unfeasible, turning off air conditioning and opening windows for good ventilation is recommended

Wherever possible, patients under investigation for SARS should be separated from those diagnosed with the syndrome.

Disposable equipment should be used wherever possible in the treatment and care of patients with SARS. If devices are to be reused, they should be sterilised in accordance with manufacturers' instructions. Surfaces should be cleaned with broad spectrum (bactericidal, fungicidal, and virucidal) disinfectants of proven efficacy.

Patient movement should be avoided as much as possible. Patients being moved should wear a surgical mask to minimise dispersal of droplets. NIOSH standard masks (N95), often used to protect against other highly transmissible respiratory infections such as tuberculosis, are preferred if tolerated by the patient. All visitors, staff, students and volunteers should wear a N95 mask on entering the room of a patient with confirmed or suspected SARS. Surgical masks are a less effective alternative to N95 masks.

Handwashing is the most important hygiene measure in preventing the spread of infection. Gloves are not a substitute for handwashing. Hands should be washed before and after significant contact with any patient, after activities likely to cause contamination and after removing gloves. Alcohol-based skin disinfectants formulated for use without water may be used in certain limited circumstances.

Health care workers are advised to wear gloves for all patient handling. Gloves should be changed between patients and after any contact with items likely to be contaminated with respiratory secretions (masks, oxygen tubing, nasal prongs, tissues). Gowns (waterproof aprons) and head covers should be worn during procedures and patient activities that are likely to generate splashes or sprays of respiratory secretions.

HCWs must wear protective eyewear or face-shields during procedures where there is potential for splashing, splattering or spraying of blood or other body substances.

HCWs are advised to wear masks. Particulate filter personal respiratory protection devices capable of filtering 0.3um particles (N95) should be worn at all times when attending patients with suspected or confirmed SARS.

Standard precautions should be applied when handling any clinical wastes. All waste should be handled with care to avoid injuries from concealed sharps (which may not have been placed in sharps containers). Gloves and protective clothing should be worn when handling clinical waste bags and containers. Where possible, manual handling of waste should be avoided. Clinical waste must be placed in appropriate leak-resistant biohazard bags or containers labelled and disposed of safely.

Comments

Please note that this situation is rapidly evolving and that the advice given will be constantly changing as more evidence about the causation and options for treatment becomes available.

      5.3 - GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL LABORATORY PERSONNEL

  • Check that date of onset of the illness and the date of sample collection are correctly recorded on the laboratory forms.
  • Check samples for appropriateness.

Reminder­ -- samples for laboratory investigation and exclusion of known causes of atypical pneumonia should be: 

o nasopharyngeal swabs/aspirates

o blood for serology

o post mortem examination as appropriate

This should be co-ordinated through your national public health authority and CAREC.

Make relevant arrangement for dry ice availability

  • From now on, refer to Laboratory Safety Guidelines below
  • Separate serum from clot and collect serum in sterile leak-proof vials.
  • Prepare samples for preservation and overseas shipment to reference laboratory (CAREC or otherwise) in dry ice.
  • All the above steps must happen as quickly as possible so the shipment takes place as soon as possible.
  • Fill-in the appropriate laboratory reference forms, PRINT SARS suspected cases” clearly on all forms.

LABORATORY SAFETY GUIDELINES FOR HANDLING SUSPECTED SARS SAMPLES

Specimen may be processed for packaging and distribution to reference laboratories for further testing in a containment Level 2 laboratory. 

 

When handling the SARS specimens the following should be implemented:

·        The use of respirators which filter >90% of particles ranging from 0.5 um to 1.0 um e.g. N95 respirators from 3M.

·        Safety glasses or eye shields as necessary

·         Laboratory coats

·        Gloves

·        Manipulations that may produced aerosols should be carried out in a certified biological safety cabinet (BSC)

·        Centrifugation of blood should be carried out using sealed centrifuge cups and unloaded in a BSC

·        Any activities that bring hands into contact with mucosal surfaces such as eating, drinking, smoking and applying make-up are prohibited in the laboratory.

·        Protective clothing must not be worn outside the work area and must be placed in separate containers or laundry bags and autoclaved before being washed or discarded. Under no circumstances must protective clothing be taken home to be laundered.

·        Proper hand washing is required before leaving the laboratory.

Decontamination

·        Commercially available household bleach solution containing 5.25% hypochlorite, when diluted 1:10 is effective in routine decontamination of surfaces and instruments after working with SARS possibly infected materials.

·        Contaminated items such as pipettes, disposable loops etc. should be immersed in decontamination solution until autoclaving.

·        Spills involving samples should be flooded with decontamination solution and soaked for 20-30 minutes before clean up

·        Persons involved in the clean up of spills should wear gloves, safety glasses, and a laboratory coat or gown during the clean up process.

·        Respiratory protection should be considered for spills in which a substantial aerosolization is suspected when handling the samples.

Waste Disposal:

·        All infectious waste must be placed in autoclavable pans or bags for decontamination.

·        Disinfectant solution must be placed in discard pans so as to begin the decontamination process.

·        All infectious waste must be autoclaved and / or incinerated before disposal

·        Waste should be autoclaved as close to the point of generation as possible.

·        Biological indicators must be used to monitor the effectiveness of the autoclaving process. Waste may also be autoclaved centrally (away from the lab) however, it must be packaged in leakproof bags and containers and must be properly transported to the central autoclave.

·        After autoclaving, ideally, all waste should be incinerated for complete destruction.

·        All waste handlers must be properly trained to handle infectious laboratory waste.

      Transportation of specimens

Specimens should be sent as “diagnostic specimens” in accordance with the International Air Transport Association dangerous goods regulations http://www.iata.org/dangerousgoods/index and http://www.hazmat.dot.gov/rules.htm.

For complete packaging instructions see http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/pdf/packingspecimens-sars.pdf

WARNING ON ADDRESSING:

Before sending samples, please contact CAREC Customer Service:

Fax: (1.868) 628-9302

Ph: (1.868) 622-4261/2

Samples have to be sent to

The Director of CAREC

16-18 Jamaica Boulevard

Federation Park

PORT of SPAIN

Trinidad

West Indies

References:

  • PPHSN Interim Guidance: March 19 2003, Management of SARS
  • CDC Interim domestis infection control guidance in the Health care and community setting for patients with suspected SARS
  • WHO Communicable Disease Surveillance and Response, SARS updates and guidelines

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Caribbean Epidemiology Centre
16-18 Jamaica Boulevard, Federation Park
P.O. Box 164, Port of Spain
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago
Tel: (868) 622-4261, Fax: (868) 622-2792
E-mail: postmaster@carec.paho.org